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DISCOUNTING ACCOUNTABILITY
Abner S. Greene*
INTRODUCTION

S CIENCE blinds, and politics binds.

This is how American constitutional law goes, according to the ambitious and provocative
work of Professor Larry Lessig. 1 Often legal rules are constructed and
interpreted against the backdrop of accepted scientific truths.2 The
legal rulemakers and interpreters have not themselves, in these instances, self-consciously and transparently discussed and resolved the
matter at hand. Rather, they have deferred authority to science-they
have abdicated responsibility and have become unaccountable in an
important way. Science, in this way, blinds. It blinds us to the decisions we are making, allowing us to make decisions without recognizing our responsibility for those decisions. But there is a saving grace
here. Future interpreters of the same legal texts originally constructed
or interpreted in the imposing light of science can expose the earlier
understandings as erroneous if the scientific predicates are later seen
as erroneous. If the old scientific truth can be unmasked and replaced
by a new one, then judges accept the new scientific truth as a predicate for its decision. Sometimes, however, no new scientific truth is
available to play this role. In that case, judges still defer, but this time
to politics, and only if the original understanding of the text or a later
interpretation of that text was resolved openly as a normative matter
in the political process. Presumably this result obtains because it is
politicians and not judges who are directly accountable to the electorate. In such a case, responsible actors stepped forward and did not
defer to science; therefore, judges need not concern themselves with a
responsibility or accountability gap. Thus, according to Lessig, openly
normative political decisions and scientific predicates both earn deference in constitutional interpretation. In both cases, accountability is
maintained, although accepted scientific truths are accountable in a
much different way than are openly contested and resolved political
* Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law. Thanks to Martin

Flaherty, Jim Fleming, Bob Kaczorowski, and Bill Treanor for helpful comments. I
am grateful for a Fordhiam University School of Law summer research grant that
helped support this Response.
1. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constrain, 65 Fordham L Rev. 1365 (1997)
[hereinafter Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint]; Lawrence Lessig, Understanding
Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 395 (1995) [hereinafter Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings]; Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71
Tex. L. Rev. 1165 (1993) [hereinafter Lessig, Fidelity in Translation].
2. Science here includes both natural and social science. The term "science" is a
stand-in for (my phrasing here) "uncontested background understanding of something about the world."
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decisions. Of greatest importance is that in both instances, the presumably unaccountable judiciary has deferred authority.
I would like to question the role of accountability, or responsibility,
in Lessig's work. I face two problems at the outset. First: Lessig
claims, in his work on constitutional interpretation broadly put, to be
merely describing the practice of American constitutional law and not
to be normatively defending this practice. My criticisms will, in part,
accept this claim, and will themselves be descriptive. At other times I
will challenge normatively the role of accountability; to be fair, I suppose that at such times I am challenging not Lessig but the body of
doctrine as he describes it. Second: Until his article for this Symposium, Lessig had not distinguished between cases involving the allocation of power among governmental institutions and rights cases. Now,
in an important addition accompanied by an admission of earlier error,3 Lessig draws a sharp distinction between the two types of cases.
It is only in the institutional power cases that courts defer to politics
when predicates become contested; in rights cases, Lessig now argues,
when predicates move from being uncontested to contested, the
ground for such deference is removed. Although judges in rights
cases do not defer to politics when a matter is contested, according to
Lessig judicial work is still highly preservationist, preserving past commitments in a new terrain. My critique of Lessig's work in part I will
challenge his descriptive account of both institutional power and
rights cases, and will dispute normatively the underlying preservationist mode of his translation theory more generally.
Next I want to look at a specific area of constitutional law about
which Lessig and I have both written-the constitutional status of independent agencies. My principal point in part II will be that accountability once again plays a large and problematic role in Lessig's
writing. 4 I will also examine and question two other significant positions in the debate about independent agencies-the works of Stephen Calabresi and Martin Flaherty.5

3. See Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint,supra note 1, at 1392.

4. See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1994) [hereinafter Lessig & Sunstein, The Presidentand the
Administration].

5. See Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 23 (1994) [hereinafter Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments];
Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the
Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541 (1994) [hereinafter Calabresi & Prakash, The President's

Power]; Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, PluralJudiciary, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1153 (1992) [hereinafter Calabresi &

Rhodes, The Structural Constitution]; Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous
Branch, 105 Yale L.J. 1725 (1996).
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DISCOUNTING ACCOUNTABILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION GENERALLY

In much of Lessig's work, judges get to say what the law is without
assuming responsibility for such pronouncements. In this way, Lessig's theory of constitutional interpretation follows a widely held understanding that constitutional decision-making should not be done in
an openly normative manner by unelected judges. There are at least
three ways in which Lessig advances this claim. First, he argues that
judges defer to scientific predicates when those predicates undergirded an earlier text and also when they buttress a contemporary
reading of that text. Judges defer to an old scientific predicate if it is
still in place as accepted truth; they defer to a new scientific predicate
if it has displaced an old one as accepted truth. Second, at least in
institutional power cases, Lessig argues that judges defer when matters have been openly contested, in part because judicial intervention
here would appear political. Third, in rights cases, although judges do
not defer when matters have become contested, they still do not engage in openly normative or moral reasoning, but rather must closely
tie their reasoning to past commitments. Adding together these three
types of deference, we can see traces of Bickel's passive virtues in Lessig's work.6 And looking back further, we can see all those who have
advanced similar views of judicial deference to politics-back to
Thayer7 and back to Marshall's description in Marbury v. Madison of
"[q]uestions in their nature political."' But this elaborate edifice of
judicial deference, at least as set forth in the late twentieth century, is
mistaken both descriptively and normatively. The descriptive
problems come in two types. Regarding institutional power cases,
Lessig overstates the case for judicial deference when matters become
contested and when judicial intervention might appear political. Regarding rights cases, he overstates the case for judicial intervention.
The doctrine just does not divide this neatly.
Institutional power cases first: Here I want to question two of Lessig's prime examples for deference, which he discussed in earlier writing and discusses again here. The constitutional defense of
independent agencies, Lessig claims, was first grounded in understanding those agencies to be acting out of scientific expertise, and as
not acting politically. As we have come to understand all agency action (executive and independent agencies alike) as highly political, the
constitutional defense of independent agencies has accordingly weak6. See Alexander Mv.Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court
at the Bar of Politics (1962).
7. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1893).
8. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
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ened, says Lessig.f This misses two key points. First, as I shall argue
further in part II, the best argument for the constitutionality of independent agencies is not that they act apolitically, but rather that
they help combat concentrated power in the President. Second, if
Lessig were correct descriptively about independent agencies, they
would have already been declared unconstitutional or would be in
danger of being so declared. But the doctrine is against Lessig herethe last Supreme Court case on the subject, Morrison v. Olson,1" upheld the constitutionality of independent agencies by a 7-1 vote.
Lessig makes a similar mistake regarding Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc." He correctly describes the
way in which that opinion openly acknowledged the policymaking that
agencies do.'" Agencies, not courts, should fill statutory gaps when
what is really at issue is policymaking and not interpretation of congressional intent. But after an initial surge in lower court deference to
agencies, we have since returned to an unruly hodgepodge of cases
involving agency implementation of statutes. 3 Some courts defer
quite readily, while others engage in a wide-ranging search-way beyond statutory text and the most obvious sources of legislative history-in reviewing the agency action. To be sure, these courts do not
say they are making policy, but if Lessig were correct, courts would be
more concerned than they often are about the appearance of making
policy. One more point about institutional power cases: The Court
sometimes defers to politics in such cases (Garciav. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority'4 is the best example of this), but often
does not, instead invalidating legislation on various theories of separation of powers or federalism. Such cases include: Myers v. United
States,' 5 Springer v. Government of the PhilippineIslands,16 Buckley v.
Valeo,' 7 INS v. Chadha,'8 Bowsher v. Synar,'9 Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise,
Inc.20 (in the separation of powers category), New York v. United

9. See Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint,supra note 1, 1410-12; Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings, supra note 1, at 433-36.
10. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
11. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
12. See Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings, supra note 1, at 436-38.
13. See Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of FederalAdministrative Law, 1990 Duke L.J. 984, 1035-41.
14. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
15. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
16. 277 U.S. 189 (1928).
17. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
18. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
19. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
20. 501 U.S. 252 (1991).
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States,2 ' United States v. Lopez,2 " and Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida23(in the federalism category).
Regarding rights cases: Lessig's position is that state action often
prevails pursuant to background scientific understandings. For example, racial segregation prevailed according to widely accepted views
about race. When those understandings become contested and up for
grabs politically, they can no longer be used to justify state action
when claims of constitutional right are raised against the government.
The contestation of discourse weakens the governmental interest, says
Lessig. Judicial deference is no longer warranted.
This certainly helps to explain the many rights cases in which judges
pronounce controversial constitutional interpretations in the face of
openly contested political struggle. Lessig gives examples of Equal
Protection Clause cases. But now Lessig is in danger of overstating
the matter in a different way from before, this time toward too much
judicial intervention. For there are many examples of judges essentially deferring to politics even when opposite claims of right and even
when the matter is contested openly and normatively. Let me mention two examples. Despite some tinkering (okay, a lot of tinkering),
the Court has accepted the judgment of many states that the death
penalty is constitutional (or, if one prefers a different formulation, has
upheld the death penalty statutes of many states)., 4 And despite an
occasional case to the contrary, the Court has accepted the judgment
of various governmental entities that random drug testing is constitutional (same reformulation, if one prefers),25 Lessig might say, about
these cases, either that (i) the Court did actively interpret the Constitution, and just held against the rights claimant, or that (ii) the Court
could not develop a method of adjudicating these rights claims without appearing political. But I think a better explanation is that (iii)
the Court backed down in the face of strong political will to fight
crime.
Another problem with Lessig's theory as a descriptive matter is that
courts often fail to defer to changing scientific predicates, even when
given the opportunity. Let me use the preceding two examples: In
death penalty cases, a growing body of scientific evidence suggests
21. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
22. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
23. 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
24. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (upholding death penalty in

the face of evidence that African-Americans were substantially more likely to receive
that sentence than whites); Tson v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (upholding death
penalty in felony murder case where defendants did not intend to kill victims); Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding a death penalty statute that allowed for
guided discretion).

25. See Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995); National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
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that certain methods of execution are tantamount to torture (which is
something the Court has for years considered cruel and unusual punishment)., 6 But the courts do not seem to be deferring to this new
scientific predicate. In search and seizure cases, modem methods of
obtaining information about people are becoming more and more intrusive. I am thinking in particular of increased drug testing. The
Court has not, though, deferred to the new scientific predicates of intrusiveness in determining the reasonableness of such searches. In
both the death penalty and drug testing settings, one might respond
that the Court has indeed deferred responsibility just as it ought to
do-but to politics, not science. This might be true, but if true it does
not help Lessig's argument.
Lessig's theory is all about deference. It is about deference to science, about deference to politics (in institutional power cases), and
about deference to the framers' principles (in rights cases). It is important to remember that even in rights cases, where Lessig claims
judges do not defer to contemporary political resolutions of constitutional disputes, judges still must tie their "activism ... to acts with
strong democratic pedigree, 27 i.e., the framers' acts. As a normative
matter, I would like to challenge this general model of strong judicial
deference to the accountability of either science or politics (present or
past), on three grounds. First, it is not clear that accountability should
play so large a role in democratic governance. As Martin Flaherty has
eloquently argued, the vices of accountability were of great concern to
the Constitution's framers, who had witnessed exercises in legislative
dominion that had arisen in part out of a perceived need for a more
direct link between citizens and governmental actors.2 8 The framers
of the Constitution responded to the imperfections of a system that
too closely resembled direct democracy. Citing not only the experience in the states under the Articles of Confederation but also the
lesson of other nations that had fallen where there was too little buffer
between citizens' desires and government, the framers carefully chose
a system in which, if anything, it would be quite hard to tell which
governmental actor was to blame on many occasions. Madison's Federalist No. 10 is the most well-known effort to defend a republican
form of government in which citizens' desires would be refracted
through the prism of representation, and there refined. 9

26. See Deborah W. Denno, Is Electrocution an UnconstitutionalMethod of Execution? The Engineering of Death over the Century, 35 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 551
(1994); Deborah W. Denno, Testing Penry and its Progeny, 22 Am. J. Crim. L. 1

(1994).

27. Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint,supra note 1, at 1432.
28. See Flaherty,supra note 5, at 1730, 1767, 1821-25.

29. See The Federalist No. 10, at 77-84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
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One might object that I have conflated normal politics and constitutional politics, 30 and that although there are good reasons to avoid
strict deference to the former, we should still defer to the latter. This
view would still permit a normative challenge to deference to normal
politics in institutional power cases, but it would also support Lessig's
claims about deference to framing principles (constitutional politics)
in rights cases. We must ask, therefore, in what way do framing principles constrain adjudication in rights cases? How does "fit" work in
this setting? Here I want to offer a sympathetic revision of part of
Lessig's account. Lessig's theory of deference-to science, to normal
politics (in institutional power cases), and to constitutional politics (in
rights cases)-turns on a series of observations about the contested
and the uncontested. I want to use Lessig's terminology to make a
somewhat different point. We can use the concepts of the contested
and the uncontested to see that "fit" in fact does little work in the
adjudication of rights cases, that deference to framing principles is
elusive.
Distinguishing between easy cases and hard cases may help here.
One might argue that in easy rights cases, "fit" does a lot of work. But
this is a mistake. Cases are easy not because of "fit" but rather because of the presence of uncontested predicates. As these predicates
become contested, the cases become harder, and the "fit" story becomes more and more unpalatable. For example, Ronald Dworkin
uses economic justice as an example of something the Constitution
doesn't require; stating that the Constitution requires economic justice
wouldn't "fit" with the constitutional materials. 3 ' But what would it
take for economic justice to come back on the table as a serious constitutional argument? Dworkin's argument implies that it would take
an Article V amendment,32 because this is the formal way of breaking
the narrative of "fit" that rejects economic justice as a constitutional
right. But perhaps a serious constitutional argument for economic justice as a constitutional right could be made in response to social upheaval of a sort that caused people to question the goodness of a
Constitution that lacked certain minimal economic rights. The argument would become a serious one not because it "fit" with the past
nor because of an Article V amendment, but rather because the predi30. See Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discoveringthe Constitution, 93
Yale LJ. 1013 (1984).
31. See Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American
Constitution 11 (1996).
32. During the Symposium, Professor Dworkin indicated that economic justice
could come back on the table in a less formal way. He stated: "How would it get
back on the table? That depends on what you take the data set for interpretation to
be. I am disposed to think that it includes such things as legislation, revulsion, referenda, and the kind of phenomena that you are talking about." Ronald Dworkin,
Symposium, Fidelity in Constitutional Theory, Fordham University School of Law 219
(Sept. 20, 1996) (transcript on file with the Fordham Law Review).
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cate for considering it a not serious argument would be contested
socially.
As a corollary to this point about easy cases, hard cases are hard not
because of the lack of "fit," but rather because of the presence of contested predicates. For example, the constitutionality of racial affirmative action appears to be a hard case. This is so, however, not because
of the absence of a "fit" story in either direction (I happen to believe
that there is a fairly straightforward "fit" story that supports the constitutionality of racial affirmative action 33). Instead, the constitutionality of racial affirmative action appears to be a hard case because
American society is so deeply divided about whether racial affirmative
action is a good or bad thing (or, if one prefers a different formulation, because American society is so deeply divided about whether
racial affirmative action violates our constitutional principle of
equality).
Thus, it is not "fit" with the framers' intentions or with history more
broadly put that constrains judicial interpretations in rights cases.
Rather, it is the movement of an issue between the uncontested and
the contested. This is a sympathetic response to Lessig, who focuses
in illuminating ways on precisely this movement between the uncontested and contested. Where I disagree with Lessig is in his description of constitutional practice in response to whether matters are
uncontested or contested. As discussed above, the doctrine does not
neatly break down into judicial deference to normal politics in institutional power cases and to constitutional politics in rights cases.
The second normative argument against strong judicial deference to
the accountability of science or politics (present or past) is that good
reasoning can often (or at least sometimes) do a better job of ensuring
liberty than can accountability-democracy. As the preceding argument revealed, it is not so clear that our central constitutional predicate is democracy, understood as a governmental system in which the
citizens are sovereign and in which the accountability of governmental
actors to the citizens is of highest importance. Theories of constitutional interpretation that depend primarily on fidelity to framers' intent-whether in a fairly literal fashion or through a translation
model-overvalue this conception of democracy. Rather than adopting a structure with accountability-democracy as the foundation, we
have chosen instead a scheme in which accountability-democracy and
liberty understood more abstractly must compete for a foundational
role.34 I say "liberty understood more abstractly" because accountability-democracy can be seen as a tool for reaching the underlying goal
of liberty. That argument acknowledges the primacy of liberty, but
33. See Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96
Colum. L. Rev. 1, 63-70 (1996).
34. See Abner S. Greene, The Irreducible Constitution,7 J. Contemp. Legal Issues
293 (1996).
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suggests that experience has taught us that there are no direct lines to
the truth of liberty, and that only a structure such as accountabilitydemocracy, in which assuring that citizens are sovereign is valued
most highly, can properly ensure the conditions of liberty. This argument, however, tends to reduce the role of reasoning about liberty.
There is reason to believe (as the framers did) that the vox populi will
often miss good answers, distracted by self-interest and the shortterm. Judges who need not face reelection can often reason better to
protect the citizens' liberty than can the citizens themselves or their
elected representatives. Knowing what the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment thought about either officially segregated schools or
equality more generally, for example, might be less important in
reaching a good constitutional answer than engaging in moral reasoning about the concept of equality as applied to such schools, detached
from the concerns of the ballot box.
One might object that this view assumes that there are right answers
and that judges can find them. What if either right answers don't exist
or they're too hard for judges to locate? Would we not then be better
off focusing on accountability-democracy, for at least there the citizens can believe that even if they or their elected representatives
didn't get things right, at least they participated in the attempt to get
the right answer? Here perhaps the best one can say is that experience has taught us that reasoning by unelected judges has, all things
considered, provided a great bulwark against the vices of accountability-democracy, and that the principles of liberty and equality that the
Court has developed are not, in truth, derivable from the framers
without a significant addition of judicial moral reasoning.
In short, we should resist the tendency to think that the legitimacy
of government can be found only in the accountability of politics or
science. On this view, which appears to be Lessig's, legitimacy is predicated first in legal rules or interpretations made by those directly accountable to the citizens. Science can (and does) displace politics, on
this view, when its truths serve as the uncontested backdrop for legal
rules and interpretations. But judicial moral reasoning should not displace politics, the argument continues, because it lacks the (perceived)
objective status that science commands. This theory of legitimacywhich seems to undergird Lessig's work-improperly devalues moral
reasoning as an objective source of rules and interpretations, incorrectly seeing moral reasoning as free-floating rather than constrained.
Political legitimacy should be seen as stemming not only from
means-from the participation of citizens and the accountability of
their governmental agents-but also from ends-from locating the
best answers regarding cardinal principles such as liberty and equality.
The final normative argument against the accountability-democracy
theory of legal rule creation and interpretation is that it obscures the
responsibility of judges. When judges defer to either politics or sci-
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ence they do so only after a complex set of decisions. They must ask
which predicates deserve deference and at what level of generality,
they must determine which political decisionmakers deserve deference and which scientific facts exist, and so on. There is no mechanical way to make these decisions; the decisions about when and how to
defer to the perceived greater legitimacy of politics and science are
themselves contested, normative decisions. Whenever one thinks he
or she is escaping responsibility by deferring to the authority of another, it is probably wise to take a closer look. A literary example of
this problem is in Shakespeare's Measure for Measure. - There the
Duke of Vienna is unwilling to enforce the severe Viennese laws, so
he invents a trip abroad to delegate authority to Angelo, a deputy
whom he suspects will enforce the laws strictly. Rather than going
abroad, however, the Duke disguises himself as a monk, and remains
in Vienna to observe the goings-on. When Angelo's decisions go too
far, the Duke must devise a way to intervene to prevent an injustice.
Discussion of Measure for Measure often focuses on the decisions Angelo makes once authorized to act. But the Duke's behavior deserves
sharp criticism as well. The Duke should not be permitted to avoid
responsibility for the law's strict enforcement by delegating power to a
man the Duke knows will enforce the law strictly. Judicial deference
to science or politics should be similarly unmasked; the normative
choices behind the deference should be seen as placing the judiciary in
a position of responsibility, as well.
II. DISCOUNTING ACCOUNTABILrrY: INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
Just as the accountability of politics and science plays a large role in
Lessig's theory of constitutional interpretation, so does the accountability of the President play a central role in Lessig's answer to a question raised by that more general theory, namely, whether independent
agencies are constitutional. Here is the problem: Some federal agencies are headed by a multi-member group of commissioners who are
removable by the President for good cause only. The Court has upheld the constitutionality of these so-called "independent agencies, '36
but many academics have questioned this result, concluding that the
Constitution requires that the President be able to remove policymaking officials at will. 37 The academic debate over the constitutionality of independent agencies requires examination of the importance
of presidential accountability, and also reflects the difficulty of applying Lessig's translation model.
35. William Shakespeare, Measure for Measure 545 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1972).
36. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S.
349 (1958); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
37. See Calabresi & Prakash, The President'sPower,supra note 5, at 643; Lessig &
Sunstein, The President and the Administration, supra note 4, at 69-70; Geoffrey P.
Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 Sup. Ct. Rev. 41.
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Let me set forth four competing views on the question of the constitutionality of independent agencies. The diagram below shows the
following: I have argued that the framers perhaps' intended the
President to have at-will removal power over officials, but that to be
faithful to the nonconcentration-of-power principle, independent
agencies are today constitutional.3 9 Steven Calabresi has argued that
the framers established a President with at-will removal power, and
that this power must be maintained today.4" Lessig and Cass Sunstein
have argued that the framers did not require that the President have
at-will removal power, but that to be faithful to principles of accountability and coordination, independent agencies must today be deemed
unconstitutional.41 And Martin Flaherty has argued that the framers
did not require that the President have at-will removal power, and
that there is no reason to think that conclusion should today be any
different. 42
Framing

Unitary

Not Unitary

No w

Calabresi

Unitary

Not Unitary

[In this diagram, "Unitary" means at-will presidential removal of
officials is required, and "Not Unitary" means a good-cause removal
restriction is permitted.]
In the remainder of this section, I will first challenge the role that
accountability plays in Lessig and Sunstein's and Calabresi's theories.
Second, I will examine the differences between Martin Flaherty's theory and mine, in light of the fact that both of us conclude that independent agencies are constitutional. Before doing any of this,
38. See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
39. See Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Eraof PresidentialLawmaking, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 123, 149 (1994).
40. See Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments, supra note 5, at 58-60; Calabresi &
Prakash, The President's Power, supra note 5, at 642-45; Calabresi & Rhodes, The
Structural Constitution, supra note 5, at 1165-68.
41. See Lessig & Sunstein, The President and the Administration, supra note 4, at
106-08.
42. See Flaherty, supra note 5, at 1788-92.
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though, I must confess that my theory of separation of powers is based
overtly in an argument of translation that depends upon understanding the framers' views regarding presidential power and applying
those views to the post-New Deal world. To the extent that this interpretive method depends upon preserving past commitments by politically accountable actors, it is subject to at least some of the challenges
I raised above. The competing theories about independent agencies,
however, are also linked to readings of framers' intent, so to some
degree I can escape by saying I'm participating in an intramural argument, which assumes arguendo the propriety of substantial deference
to the framers. Furthermore, my argument for the constitutionality of
independent agencies, although based in the framers' commitment to
nonconcentration of powers, in the end turns on a4 contemporary
nor3
mative defense of the nonconcentration principle.
My basic argument is this: The framers established an executive
that would be strong enough to ward off the branch then feared as
most dangerous, the legislature. On the question of removal power,
the best position is probably that there was no clear framing view
about whether the President must retain at-will removal power over
officials.' But there is some evidence that the framers would have
chosen such power had they been confronted with the issue. Hamilton wrote in FederalistNo. 72 (using "Chief Magistrate" to refer to the
President):
The actual conduct of foreign negotiations, the preparatory plans of
finance, the application and disbursement of the public monies, in
conformity to the general appropriations of the legislature, the arrangement of the army and navy, the direction of the operations of
war; these and other matters of a like nature constitute what seems
to be most properly understood by the administration of government. The persons therefore, to whose immediate management
these different matters are committed, ought to be considered as the
assistants or deputies of the Chief Magistrate; and, on this account,

they ought to derive their offices from his appointment, at least
from his nomination,
superintendence.45

and

ought to be subject to

his

Although "subject to his superintendence" could mean simply that the
President should have directive power over officials, it is fairly strong
evidence for removal power, as well. But whether we conclude that
the framers required presidential at-will removal power, or merely assume this for purposes of argument, independent agencies are nonetheless constitutional today. Of central importance is the fact that the
43. See Greene, supra note 39, at 131-33.
44. See Flaherty, supra note 5, at 1788-92. Compare Myers v. United States, 272
U.S. 52 (1926) (Taft, C.J.) with Edward S. Corwin, Tenure of Office and the Removal
Power Under the Constitution, 27 Colum. L. Rev. 353 (1927).
45. The Federalist No. 72, at 435-36 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter, ed.,
1961) (emphasis added).
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framers did not give the executive lawmaking powers, for the central
principle animating the construction of the federal separation of powers was that of nonconcentration of power. The framers didn't want a
king any more than they wanted overreaching legislatures. In the
twentieth century, Congress has delegated great amounts of legislative
power to agencies, and the Court has not enforced the nondelegation
doctrine. If the President had control over all of this legislative power
and his own executive power, the concentration of power in the President would be dangerous. Thus, it is permissible for Congress to establish agencies that are independent of the President even though the
framers might have resisted such an arrangement, because this preserves the core principle against concentrated governmental power.
Conversely, Congress may not draw executive power to itself through
participating, say, in the removal of officers, and it may not exercise
legislative power in a way that skirts the bicameralism and presentment provisions of Article I, Section 7, through, say, a legislative veto.
In both instances Congress would be concentrating power in itself,
which is just as problematic as concentration of power in the
President.
My argument captures the Court's doctrine from Myer 6 through
Morrison,47 and beyond. The nonconcentration-of-power principle is
the driving force behind the Court's doctrine even though the Court
has not always justified its holdings in this fashion. Accountability not
only is not a central concern, but the Court's doctrine has left a large
accountability gap. Instead of insisting that the President, an
electorally accountable actor, have at-will removal power over agency
heads, the Court has allowed good-cause removal restrictions. And
instead of allowing Congress, an electorally accountable actor, to play
a role in executing the laws or in legislating outside Article I, Section
7, the Court has invalidated such congressional control mechanisms.
Both Calabresi and Lessig and Sunstein argue that independent
agencies are unconstitutional, although they reach this conclusion
through dramatically different arguments. Calabresi argues that both
text and history show that at-will removal power is required. Further,
he contends that the need to preserve accountability and to prevent
factionalization demand that the rule requiring at-will removal power
be maintained today. Lessig and Sunstein set forth impressive historical evidence showing that in the years following the Constitution's ratification, various officials carrying out federal law operated with
significant independence from the President. Despite this evidence of
the lack of concern about presidential accountability during those
early years,' Lessig and Sunstein conclude that independent agencies
46. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
47. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
48. The evidence is not strong enough, though, to show that the framers or early
interpreters would have permitted good-cause rather than at-will removal power in
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are today unconstitutional. Relying (as I do) on the great amounts of
legislative power delegated by Congress, they reach the opposite conclusion from mine: accountability and coordination, they contend, require that delegated legislative power be united under the President
and not dispersed to agencies independent from the President.
This conclusion is odd. First, what is the source of presidential accountability as foundational and in need of preservation? Lessig and
Sunstein establish a very interesting historical case for precisely the
opposite conclusion, namely, that those who interpreted the Constitution in practice in its earliest years did not deem presidential accountability so important. Indeed, Martin Flaherty has made an impressive
historical case for the concerns the framers had about plebiscitary democracy, about the desire to fracture accountability. Perhaps recognizing this problem, Lessig and Sunstein qualify the historical claim so
as to leave room for the later argument for at-will removal power.
They write, "where no special reason existed to separate responsibility
from the President, the pattern of original executive structures
strongly supports the conclusion that the President remains accountable for the actions of government officers." 49 But according to Lessig
and Sunstein's historical arguments, "special reasons" to separate responsibility from the President included criminal prosecutions, control
of some Treasury Department functions, and control of some Postmaster General functions. If these can count as "special reasons" to
limit presidential removal to good cause, then the case for presidential
accountability more generally is gravely weakened.
Second, Lessig and Sunstein fail to acknowledge the importance of
the nonconcentration-of-power principle. This principle is not just
something that existed at the periphery of the framers' consciousness.
There is ample evidence to support the conclusion that the fear of
either legislative or executive supremacy led the framers to an elaborate checks and balances structure that would prevent either department from gaining the upper hand. Part of this package included
lawmaking by the legislature, not the executive. If the framers knew
that the executive would one day be given vast policy-making power
and that the Court would permit this to happen, they surely would
have found other ways to provide for checks against executive dominion. The concern with concentration of power in the President cannot
simply be overridden or outweighed by citing "accountability" or
"coordination."

the President over key executive officials. Showing that various areas of execution
existed independently of presidential control is not the same thing as showing that if
push came to shove and the President insisted on removing a policy-making official,
he could have been constitutionally blocked by a law demanding a showing of good
cause.

49. Lessig & Sunstein, The Presidentand the Administration, supra note 4, at 94.
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Martin Flaherty agrees with Lessig and Sunstein's historical predicate-at-will removal power not required-but agrees with my conclusion that independent agencies are constitutional. I have some
concerns, though, with Flaherty's argument. First, he fails to discuss
FederalistNo. 72, which contains some of the most persuasive evidence that the framers thought the President should be able to remove officials at will.50 Second, he backs a view that would defer to
congressional framework legislation unless it violates a clear textual
command or represents a clear violation of underlying separation of
powers principles. Flaherty thus criticizes the Court's invalidation of
legislative vetoes in INS v. Chadha5 ' and of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act in Bowsher v. Synar.1 But in both instances, Flaherty fails
to address the concentration-of-power problem raised by the legislation at issue, even though he had earlier admitted that balance of
power was a core concern of the framers and should still be today.
Now it is true that legislative vetoes can be seen as taking back some
of what Congress gave away, and thus as rebalancing power. But allowing Congress to have the final say over significant swaths of federal
legislation, without having to present the legislative veto to the President for his signature or veto (which may be overridden), risks concentration of power in the Congress. 3 Similarly, the law invalidated
in Bowsher gave Congress the power to fire the Comptroller General,
and giving Congress such executive power again concentrates power
in one branch inappropriately.
Flaherty criticizes my focus on concentration of power (or aggrandizement) as formalist. He argues that Congress aggrandizes power
every day, "whether by statute, restrictions it places on presidential
removal power, or (formerly) legislative vetoes."' There is no "foreordained baseline," to determine what counts as aggrandizement, argues Flaherty, and any such baseline "is just another type of
formalism."5 5 Aggrandizement, adds Flaherty, "is not necessarily a
bad thing from the Founding perspective."56 Sometimes preventing
aggrandizement can violate core separation of powers principles, he
maintains; for example, he argues, invalidating the legislative veto
"ignores the role that this device played in maintaining a balance between Congress ...

s
and the executive."-5

Let me start with the last point first, which might just be a semantic
squabble. Aggrandizement is necessarily a bad thing from the foun50. See supra text accompanying note 45.
51. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
52. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).

53. There are some exceptions. See Greene, supra note 39, at 179-95 (suggesting a
modification of the Chadha holding in certain narrow circumstances).
54. Flaherty, supra note 5, at 1829 n.537.
55. Id

56. Id.
57. Id
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ders' perspective, and from ours as well.5" Aggrandizement involves
one department grabbing another department's power or rendering
the exercise of its own power easier than the Constitution permits.
The question is not whether aggrandizement is necessarily a bad thing;
rather, the question should be, What counts as aggrandizement?
In defining what counts as congressional aggrandizement, Flaherty
improperly lumps together statutes, restrictions on presidential removal power, and legislative vetoes. Statutes and restrictions on presidential removal power indeed represent congressional assertions of
power, but statutes (generally) and restrictions on presidential removal power do not involve Congress tinkering with the lawmaking
structure so as to give itself a final say or tinkering with the structure
of execution so as to give itself a role in executing the laws. The concern with aggrandizement is a concern with one branch of government
taking another branch's power or making it too easy to exercise its
own power; the concern is not with core assertions of branch power
(statutes) or with regulation of another branch's power without taking
that power (independent agencies).
Finally, Flaherty uses the term "formalist" both in criticizing my position and throughout his article to refer to (among other things) judicial decisions that invalidate framework legislation (such as Chadha
and Bowsher) and to theories that support such decisions. He uses the
term "functionalist" to refer to the view that would defer to Congress
on these matters. This seems to me an unhelpful way to use these
terms. One can defend the Court's results in cases such as Chadha
and Bowsher not via a rigid tripartite view of what the three branches
of government are allowed to do (a defense that might properly be
criticized as formalist), but rather through a purposive argument that
would invalidate the legislative veto and the structure of authority
over the Comptroller General because of the risk of concentrating
power in the legislature. It is not clear to me why invalidating such
legislation on this reasoning should be called "formalist."
CONCLUSION

Judicial deference plays a significant role in Larry Lessig's work.
Judges defer to the uncontested background of scientific facts, they
defer to politics (in institutional power cases) when matters are contested, and they defer to framing principles in rights cases. An analogue to judges, the unaccountable independent agencies are
constitutionally problematic, says Lessig, because once we understand
that agencies (often) make policy, the accountable President should
58. In addition to the cases involving congressional aggrandizement discussed in
the text, the Court has also invalidated instances of presidential aggrandizement. See
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (refusing to allow claim of executive privilege); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (refusing to allow
presidential seizure of steel mills).
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have at-will removal power over policymaking officials. Accountability, on this account, plays two different roles, one that I'll call "affirmative" and the other that I'll call "negative." The affirmative role of
accountability is to tie governmental power directly to the citizens.
Insisting that the President have at-will removal power is an example
of this; the President must answer at the ballot box, independent
agencies are not so encumbered. The negative role of accountability
ensures that judges do not exercise political will. Developing an edifice of constraints that is built on past political actions-for example,
ratified text, that text's structure, and its history-is an example of
this.
It is hard to argue that accountability does not matter to American
constitutional law, in both its affirmative and negative aspects. But
accountability does not require that constitutional interpretation be
tied either to science or politics (present or past) or that the President
be at the top of a chain of command over agency policy-making. Constraints both past and present necessarily exist, and are not in danger
of escaping. Regarding the past: We should not forget constraints of
endogeneity and of reasoning. Judges in our system cannot help but
be constrained, in this broad (and, yes, weak) way, by text, structure,
and history. Judges live in our system and have been trained in it.
And reasoning provides its own constraints. As a descriptive matter,
it's not clear that the interpretation of the majestic and vague
clauses-free speech, due process, equal protection, to name threehas been constrained in any stronger fashion than that provided by
the constraints of endogeneity and reasoning. Regarding the present,
and the presidency: Plenty of ballot box accountability remains even
regarding independent agencies. They are created, dismantled,
funded, and authorized to act through Acts of Congress that the President must either sign or see enacted over his veto. The agency commissioners are appointed by the President by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate (and must be so reappointed), and the President
often has the statutory power to name and remove the agency chair.
Further, as a matter of political reality, both executive and independent agencies often seek presidential support, whether the5 9support
comes in the form of information or congressional lobbying.
Accountability cannot be written out of our constitutional scheme.
But it can, and should be, discounted. Other values-such as reaching
good answers on questions raised by the majestic vague clauses of free
speech, due process, equal protection, and the like; such as ensuring
against concentration of power in the President-must be accounted
for, as well.

59. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 587-95 (1984).

